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ABSTRACT
This thesis begins by examining the history of Italian
participation in Europe's southern flank since 1945, focusing
upon the reasons for their apparent weakness in taking a
leading role. It then considers Italy's present posture
within the new European order and attempts to make informed
judgements as to the course of its role in European security.
Europe has had two restructurings in recent history. This
thesis examines the development of Italian statecraft after
the first changes in 1945 to see if anything can be gleaned
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This analysis will examine the history of Italy's
participation in NATO and Europe's southern flank since 1946
in order to reach informed judgments about Italy's probable
future role in European security.
After World War II many West European leaders realized
that security in Europe would best be obtained through an
alliance structure. The consensus of these leaders was that
the Soviet Union was now emerging as not only the most
powerful European nation but also a threat to Western
democracies. The alliances formed against the Axis powers in
World War II were fine examples of the synergistic effect of
collective defense. A new alliance would now emerge from that
example
.
From late in 1947 and through 1948 the question of Italian
membership in NATO raised the issue of what NATO's basic
strategy should be based upon. Some European leaders, notably
the British, opposed Italy's inclusion in the Alliance because
they regarded the Mediterranean country as susceptible to
Communist subversion, as well as being outside the alliance's
original geographical and strategic focus. [Ref. 1]
There was originally no thought as to a "southern flank"
for NATO. Although the North Atlantic Treaty was originally
intended to be strictly a north Atlantic pact, Italy's
strategic geography was deemed important enough to include
Italy to help guard the Alliance's south-east region. It was
this same strategic geography which brought Turkey into the
Alliance and with it a stronger control over the straits to
the Black Sea. [Ref. 2] Italy's eventual inclusion
was indeed important with the possibility of an Italian
Communist Party victory in the 1948 elections.
[Ref. 3]
Italy indeed desired to be an equal partner but its early
government was too weak to assert a strong foreign policy.
The Italian population was also leery of strong government
which moved too fast. This resulted in Italy beginning the
new European order after World War II as a passive
participant. For decades, geographic position has been
Italy's biggest contribution to the Alliance's southern flank.
This has been true for both land based nuclear systems as well
as forward-deployed American military forces. With the
formation of NATO in 1949, and Italy's participation in it,
the U.S. felt the Mediterranean region could be stabilized
while also demonstrating Western resistance to Communist
influence. [Ref. 4]
The development of the Cold War between the East and West
brought into focus the importance of keeping strategic
countries like Italy within NATO. Viewing the Italian
Communists as tools of Soviet foreign policy, the United
States sought to weaken their influence in the labor movement
by bolstering the Christian Democratic party as a countering
force
.
Most of Italy's relationship within NATO has been
bilateral with the United States. The U.S. encouraged Italy
to develop into a strong, stable democratic nation; but
Italy's weak coalition government, and its unique political-
military culture, may have resulted in Italy not taking on a
leading role within NATO and having most of its security
policy set outside its borders by more influential members of
the Atlantic Alliance. The revision of the Peace Treaty in
the autumn of 1947 completed the transformation of Italy from
its role as a defeated enemy in a world war into a full
partner within the Western European community. It was then
that the Italians had the chance to become a significant power
within the Alliance, but they did not do so. This thesis will
show how Italy had no real external constraints, as did post-
war Germany, but was hindered by its unique political system.
Even with its strong economic recovery within Europe, Italy
continues to take a following role. With the recent sweeping
changes in Europe, can they now emerge from their relatively
weak position to be a leader in Europe's southern flank?
There has been growing assertiveness in Italian foreign
and defense policy, reflecting a natural desire for a new
international role. This uncharacteristic activism in
security issues makes it difficult to predict the course of
Italian policy. Can the Italians take a leading role in the
definition of a security policy? Will this policy be based on
more of a pan-European alliance or will Italy, as well as
other nations fracture off and develop a southern alliance?
To what extent can the Italians surmount their historical
formations and pursue more autonomous policies?
Some experts observe that, historically, Italian
politicians have been more concerned with image than any real
decision-making. The government appears to be in a perpetual
state of political crisis and is characterized by the power
struggle among the Christian Democrats, Communists, Liberals
and Socialists, with the deterioration of legitimacy a
significant problem.
With the current fall of Communist power in the East, many
questions need to be addressed concerning security in the new
Europe. The future of NATO itself is under question.
Negotiations are currently under way to reorganize NATO's
structure and to determine its role in meeting the new
challenges. At the same time there is ongoing dialogue to
increase the EC's influence over political, economic, defense
and foreign policy. It will be interesting to see what level
of participation the Italians will take and whether that role
will be within a NATO framework or be centered upon a more
Western European defense policy.
This paper will include the very important collapse of the
Communist East Bloc and the implications for Italy. With
Italy's unique political-military background and its
relatively subservient historical role within NATO, will Italy-
be a partner of increased responsibility within a restructured
NATO and guard its southern flank? Will the Italians respond
to the new threats posed by the Eastern Bloc with their own
internally developed security policy, or will Italy once again
stand in solidarity and take policy direction from an
alliance?
The methodology of this paper will be to begin by
examining the history of Italian participation within Europe's
southern flank, focusing upon the reasons for the apparent
weakness they have had taking a leading role. It will then
consider Italy's present posture within the new European order
and attempt to make informed judgments as to the course of its
role in European security. Europe has been restructured twice
in recent history. This thesis will examine Italy after the
first change of 1946 and see if anything can be gleaned about
Italy's posture after the changes in 1991.
II. HISTORICAL ASPECTS
A. SECURITY AFTER WORLD WAR II
It would be most difficult to examine present Italian
policy without a clear understanding of how its unique
position was formed. After World War II, Italy launched upon
a totally new political start. The new government was made up
of many political leaders from the pre-Mussolini era, although
a fair amount stayed on after the demise of the fascist
regime. The most notable politician from the pre-fascist
period was Alcide De Gasperi . He was the leading figure in
early post-war politics but was the leader of the Catholic
Popular Party in the early 1920 when Benito Mussolini forced
him to resign.
It is interesting to note that other Italian political
figures also reemerged from a period of dormancy to contend
for post-war power in Italy. The vintage liberals, Orlando &
Nitti, who represented Italy at the Paris Peace Conference in
1919 were back in Rome as was the early Italian Communist
Party leader, Togliatti. So although a new period for Italy
was beginning, it would be marked at first by a continuation
of a political conflict which began in 1919 and was only
postponed by Mussolini's period of control. [Ref. 5]
The reemerging conflict was to be one which would stay a part
of Italian politics until very recently, that being the
conflict for control within the government between the Italian
Communists and the coalition of the right.
Post-war Italy was dominated by a longer period of under-
development and economic stagnation than other West European
nations. Many of Italy's industries and much of its
industrial capacity which had been built up were destroyed by
the allies. The devastating results were seen in areas such
as iron and steel production, which were down by 90%. With a
high illiteracy rate and much of the population employed by
agriculture, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) took a strong
foothold and Italian politics would be marked by
contradiction for decades.
B. FORMING AN ALLIANCE
The results of Italy's first election were indicative of
the political diversity facing the nation. In June of 1946,
Italians voted a governing body with a majority made up of
Christian Democrats with 35%, Socialists with 21% and
Communists holding 19%. Both the Italian Communist Party and
the Socialist Party could trace their origins to revolutionary
Marxism. They diverged after the Russian Revolution but later
realized this division would hamper each other's progress;
therefore they decided to cooperate more closely in the post-
1945 era. It was apparent to the Italians, as well as to
Western leadership, that Communist expansion was threatening
to cause an ideological showdown in Italy and the Communist
strength would have to be appropriately dealt with.
In 1947 the United States took the position that not only
should the West fear an outright war with the Soviets, but
there was an equal threat of Communist subversion undermining
West European democracies. Italy stood out as one European
nation which appeared to be an example of this type of threat.
Three areas of concern were addressed by the United States.
The first would be to protect Western European governments
from internal subversion by communist parties. The second
interest was to protect against an all-out Soviet invasion,
and the third was to build an aura of credibility and
solidarity within Europe so that economic recovery could get
a strong start. [Ref. 6]
Late in 1947 as negotiations began in Northern Europe to
consider a North Atlantic Treaty, Italy would emerge as a
significant question as to what the Alliance's strategic
posture would be. The United States became deeply involved in
the Italian question. The American goal was to integrate
Italy into the negotiations of a Western Alliance. The
British at first objected to Italian inclusion, stating that
the Mediterranean nation was outside the proposed charter of
the North Atlantic Treaty. [Ref. 7]
C. POWERS WITHIN NATO
In 1948, the National Security Council also saw the
Communist threat in Italy but had an added concern over
preserving sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean.
The council saw Italy's geographic location as strategic on
this point. The NSC recommended using all possible influence
to keep Italy from becoming dominated by the Soviets directly
or indirectly through the Soviet-influenced Italian Communist
Party. [Ref. 8] What developed soon after this was a
constant, strong involvement by the United States to support
Italian democracy and to bolster southern flank security.
Italy would be the devoted follower in this bilateral
relationship which has marked Italian security policy even
until the present time. [Ref. 9]
The United States' assistance originally came in the form
of support for the Christian Democrats and their Prime
Minister, Alcide De Gasperi . The U.S. saw membership in the
Brussels Pact as a vehicle to get Italy into the North
Atlantic Alliance. In the period of February-April 1948,
Secretary of State George Marshall and John Foster Dulles
lobbied heavily with West European nations to invite De
Gasperi and the Italians to join the pact with the ultimate
objective of North Atlantic Treaty participation.
[Ref. 10] The Italians wanted to be included in a
defense pact, and the Christian Democrats urged the Italians
not to stand alone but to be included.
D. THE ITALIAN ROLE
The April 1948 Italian elections placed the Christian
Democrats on top. The controlling coalition parties to-the-
right excluded the PCI from participation in the government.
The coalition government sought U.S. support, knowing that
this would guarantee aid if the Soviets showed a tough hand in
Italy.
The United States suggested that it was not interested in
entering the Brussels Pact alone and once again gave Italy
support for inclusion. Most European countries, except
France, still rejected Italy's inclusion on the grounds that
it was too big of a threat by being unstable, and outside of
the realm of the pact. They were still not convinced that
Italy would be a strong democracy and also that the Communist
party was too strong. These countries also did not see many
southern threats but instead felt the Central Front was
paramount
.
France did not see it quite the same and demanded Italian
participation. France also had a strong communist party and
many colonial interests and desired a viable southern flank
defense. In the Treaty of Brussels, Great Britain, France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands committed themselves
to a common defense. These West Europeans soon realized
their combined military forces would not be strong enough to
10
counter the Soviet threat without help from the United States.
[Ref. 11]
The U.S., not wanting to have Italy isolated, moved on to
endorse Italian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty.
After months of intense negotiations over membership, Italy
was invited to join and later became a charter member of NATO
on April 4, 1949. The admittance into the Alliance forged the
strong statement that Italy was now aligned with Western
ideology
.
By showing US and European resolve to bolster Italian
democracy, Italy would now have the opportunity to grow
economically while also being a strategic link in Western
defense. Italy became somewhat of an unwilling player in the
Cold War of ideology between East and West. Any internal
subversion by the PCI would be thought of as Soviet motivated
and would be addressed quickly by Western forces.
In closing this first chapter of Italy's post-war history,
it appears that Italy actually saw less of a military threat
from the Soviets than did other Westerners. The Italians saw
the threat as internal in the form of the PCI. The Soviets
too, originally saw little threat from Italy until it became
an integral part of the West. They would not fear Italy so
much as they would fear Italy's friends. This, of course, was
the perception desired by NATO.
It is important to keep in mind that Italy is one of the
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younger countries in Europe. Its geographic unification only
took place a little over one hundred years ago and its
political system has been operating since 1946. Italian
leadership does not benefit from long-standing tradition or
stability. The early leadership after World War II took a
very conservative posture. Italy's population appeared not to
trust big government and it could only tolerate change at a
very slow pace. This passive approach was due in part to
reaction to the fresh memories of Mussolini's military
adventurism which brought great defeat. This hesitation,
coupled with an ineffective post war government, resulted in
Italy defining its security policy in terms of NATO
requirements
.
The growing dependence upon the United States also
influenced the foreign policy of Italy by never allowing it to
become independent in NATO's southern flank; a position it
deserved. While American leaders wanted Italy to take a
firmer stand in the development of foreign policy, Italian
statecraft just never materialized. The strong anti-Soviet
course enforced rigid restrictions on Italian attempts at
policy formation and internal activities within the political
sphere were controlled. In retrospect, it is amazing that a
foreign country, such as the United States, could be so
dominating over Italy for an extended period of time. Such
was the case, because Washington saw a tremendous threat of
Communist subversion and security in the Mediterranean. It
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also perceived an inability on Italy's part to deal with these
threats effectively.
With the Cold War beginning between the East and West, it
was important for the involved superpowers to strategically
organize their surrogate nations early and try to hold ground.
During the decades of tensions Italy fulfilled three missions
for NATO. First was its southern air-land defense net, second
is Italy's cooperation in Mediterranean Naval operations, and
last is its loyal deployment of US nuclear forces.
E. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ITALIAN DEVELOPMENT
Any speculation on the future must take into account the
historical conditions of the past. Italy's rebirth after 1945
was severely influenced by the emerging superpower struggle in
a bipolar world. To review Italo-Soviet relations one must
reflect back to post World War II developments. The Soviet
Union emerged from a World War II ally into an opponent of
Western democracy and ideology. It was then, in the late
1940s, that Europe was divided into two camps with an
unnatural border being drawn down Central Europe from the
Baltic to the Adriatic Sea with Italy near the border. The
West's immediate answer to the perceived Soviet threat was the
North Atlantic Alliance.
Italy had virtually no effective government in the
immediate post war period. There was an immediate threat of
strong Communist rule in Italy. With the help of the United
13
States, the Christian Democrats took a controlling interest in
Italy and the Constitution of the Republic of Italy was
proclaimed in January 1948. With the strongest Communist
party in the west (the PCI) Italian politics was marked by
contradiction
.
Italy's strategic geography was deemed important enough,
with the Cold War looming, to include it as a safeguard to the
Alliance's south-east region as well as a means of showing
West European and U.S. resolve to bolster Italy's internal
struggle for democracy. With the earlier Communist gains in
Yugoslavia, the help came just in time as the PCI rallied for
control in the 1948 Italian elections. The vote came to a
choice of camps with the Christian Democrats, and its Atlantic
Alliance, acquiring control.
Next to Germany, Italy would be the second most important
country for communist showdowns and East-West struggle.
Unfortunately, Italy's internal political struggles would keep
it from developing its own security policy for decades; Italy
relied upon NATO for strategic security while a perpetual
debate of ideology went on in Rome. Italy's divided
government has been debating the superpower struggle, and how
it has effected their development, but they appear to spend
most of their time talking about it with no action. This has
been one of the most important factors keeping Italy from
developing a strong foreign policy.
14
In retrospect, the first years of Italy's alliance with
the West furnished the basis for its eventual firm stand
against total control by the Soviet sphere. The west was able
to "jump start" the cold war within Italy, but Italians seemed
to have enough fuel in the early post war years to keep some
conflict with the Soviets going. Two such distractions were,
uneven war reparations and the Soviet support for Yugoslavia's
Trieste claims.
The Soviets had hoped for a more amiable rapport with
Italy and a freer hand. The West's quick moves in Italy
appeared successful and Stalin saw his maneuvering room
tightened in this first phase of Italo-Soviet relations.
Early Soviet policy was based upon Stalin's belief that
Europe should be dominated by the Soviet Union after World War
II. Although he agreed at Yalta to divide Europe and retain
a Soviet sphere of influence in the East, he would later
submit that Italy and Western Europe were "European" concerns,
not US ones, and should come under the influence of his
system.
Stalin and other Soviet leaders were constantly annoyed at
the United States' influence on the European continent. This
constant irritation drove the Soviets from one foreign policy
to another in an attempt to "shake" Western European nations
like Italy free of reliance on the US. The Soviets had
focused their policies to reflect their goal of delegitimizing
NATO and Western alliances. They have done this in several
15
effective ways. First, they have undermined the credibility
of nuclear deterrence by promoting bilateral nuclear weapons
reductions in Europe between the United States and the USSR.
Gorbachev and Reagan both advocated the elimination of nuclear
weapons and declared that nuclear war cannot be won, so should
not be waged. The INF Treaty helped to give credibility to
Gorbachev's position. Secondly, the Soviets have consistently
tried to erode existing security arrangements between western
allies. Bilateral incentives with the USSR were used to draw
each member away from a western alliance. This could be
argued as only marginally successful because although
countries like Italy used these incentives to negotiate
favorable trade and security treaties, western alliances have
not dissolved. Although, these tactics have been successful in
gaining support of an "Equdistancing" in Italy and the rest of
Western Europe. [Ref. 12]
Even up until their demise the Soviets had long envisioned
NATO's weakness to be political. To attack this weak point
would be to undermine the western coalition and hopefully
decrease it's military effectiveness. [Ref. 13] A
more advanced possibility of this theme might be to pressure
southern flank states, like Italy, to opt out of the Alliance
to preserve their country once a conflict begins on the
central front. This offer to keep a country from being
effected by nuclear weapons was very inviting. Soviet
propaganda would play up the United States' role of causing
16
the crisis and show how the US would also escalate the
conflict
.
The policy of "peaceful coexistence" designed by
Khrushchev in the early 1960s focused upon the international
struggle between Capitalism and Socialism. The Soviets
embarked upon a program of delegitimizing the West's
capitalistic position and reinforcing the gains of socialism
without having their opponents take up arms. This new program
resulted in the Soviets building their foreign policy upon the
concept of peaceful coexistence with competing systems around
the world. [Ref. 14] The PCI as well as the
Socialists in Italy warmed up to this type of policy resulting
in a continued political struggle within the coalition
government
.
The Soviets would provide peaceful conditions for the
building of world socialism. It was an accepted belief in the
East that with this policy, the war of ideology, politics and
economies would be won. Soviet propaganda sought to show that
war was a tool of Imperialism and that Western Europeans
should ease the threat of war by leaving the Western Alliance
to deal with the Soviet Union bilaterally. Of course, the
Soviet leadership believed that delegitimizing the Western
Alliance and dealing with West European nations one at a time
would be a way of expanding Soviet control and neutralizing
United States influence.
17
Their policy of peaceful coexistence did not mean no
violence. Anything short of inciting full military action was
acceptable. This meant that salami tactics, political
revolution and coups were tactics of choice. Italy would be
the receipient of all these tactics. Their "minor wars" were
to be fought from within each country to give the appearance
of an internal struggle against Capitalism. The Soviet
policies were not totally effective in Italy. By the late
1950s it was becoming obvious that the political instability
which was first a Communist goal, was now actually hindering
development of both a democracy as well as a social state.
There is no special slant to Italo-Soviet relations with
regard to foreign policy. The Soviets saw few threats from
the Italians themselves. But being Western and part of NATO
were the most significant threats. Soviet policy toward the
West has been to divide and influence. The Italians saw more
of an ideological war, never feeling the military threat as
did other westerners. This may have been because of Italy's
acceptance of a large Communist party within its system. The
Italians, more than any other Western nation, has had the most
direct contact with the Communist Party.
Bilateral relations between Italians and Russians continue
to be good. The major threat from Communism which Italy had
faced up until the Soviet break-up had not been an external
one of Soviet origin but an internal threat by the Italian
Communist Party (PCI). The Italian Communists have to date
not been allowed to participate in the governing coalition
leadership in Italy but have, until recently, held
approximately 35% of the local vote. They gained legitimacy
when they abandoned their anti-NATO policy in the 1970s and
moved "right" in an unsuccessful effort to seek governing
cabinet posts
.
They have always reaffirmed their separate path of Italian
Socialism and became at odds with Moscow after the suppression
of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and later in 1979 when the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan. After the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the Italian PCI lost most of its funding
as well as most of its popular support in Italy. It has
shrunk to a fraction of its former size and has attempted to
align itself with the Right by casting off its "Communist"
name in favor of a more conservative sounding "Democratic
Party of the Left." One would think that Italy's once divided
government would now become strong. As will be explained,
this appears not to be the case, for even now more parties are
springing up in Italy to once again dilute the controlling
coalition. An example of the continued instability is the
fact that Italy went without a national government from the
elections on April 5, 1992 until the end of May.
[Ref. 15]
The Soviets attempted to draw legitimacy away from NATO
and U.S. influence. They used several methods over the
decades to achieve this but had little success. When
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Gorbachev came to power in March of 1985, he brought with him
a new reformist course for his country. He revised the old
views and brought in a new era of cooperation with flexible
foreign policy. These new changes helped in eventually
bringing a collapse of Communism and a reduction of East-West
tension
.
Gorbachev, as well as other Soviet leaders, desired to
reduce the U.S. influence in the southern flank and strengthen
the Soviet position. A series of mini-summits ensued whereby
Gorbachev sought to align with each West European country
bilaterally. What appeared successful on the surface proved
unsuccessful under closer examination. The Western system of
alliance was just as strong as ever, being inherently designed
to be strong against an influential Soviet Union. The North
Atlantic Alliance was specifically designed to meet the Soviet
threat and was directly responsible for its demise; a
successful track record indeed. The West stood strong in
solidarity long enough for the communist system to crumble
under its own weight.
There is a widespread perception in Italy that the Cold
War has been over for several years. It is believed that the
emerging era will stress economic and political factors and
military power will only be of secondary concern. If politics
and economics are paramount in a new Europe, Italy sees the
opportunity to emerge into a new leadership role in East-West
relations. There is a sense that Italy can now be recognized
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by utilizing its economic assets and be a player in an arena
which was previously reserved for Alliance members with higher
military stature. Italy seeks a leading role in negotiations
with Moscow on the basis of being a flexible nation with a
unique position and ability to facilitate cooperation which no
other West European country can accomplish. The Italian
leadership feels that now is the time for Europeans to move to
the front seat of East-West negotiations. Italy's Prime
Minister, Andreotti, has suggested in early 1992 that it is up
to the Europeans to conduct dialogue with the Soviet Union.
It is no secret that Italy has been more concerned with
economic issues than political ones. Despite the years of
faithful alliance in the West, the Italian private sector has
been very active in pursuing investment initiatives in the
Soviet Union. Both Fiat and ENI (Italy's energy giant) have
sought investment and trade within the Eastern Bloc with ENI
seeking large amounts of Soviet natural gas and electricity.
Italy currently ranks second behind Germany in the value
of its direct investment in the Soviet Union with growth
continuing well above that of the other West European nations. [Ref . 16]
Italy believes that it can make a unique contribution to
detente by exploiting all possible avenues of economic
relations with the East. This is, of course, a worthwhile
proposition because most of the former Eastern Bloc,
especially the former Soviet Union, are in the midst of
economic collapse.
21
Italy, with its history of favorable economic relations
with East Europe, is in a very good position to help negotiate
East-West cooperation. Gianni De Michelis, Italy's Foreign
Minister, sees economic recovery not coming quick enough in
Central and Eastern Europe and advocates bringing these
countries into the EC with eventual full membership possible
in an alliance. [Ref. 17]
The deterioration of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and
the subsequent threat reduction has spurred the United States
to withdraw troops and support from Europe. With this drastic
change in U.S. policy, Italians will gravitate toward a common
European defense. Along with the other West European
countries, Italy will need to reassess its security policy and
its position within the Atlantic Alliance and the European
Community
.
At present it appears that a Franco-German defense
coalition may be the best base for building a common European
defense. Although Italy supports an indigenous European
defense endeavor, it is uncomfortable about allowing it to be
solely a Franco-German collaboration and fear that the south
will be isolated. Italy proposes that a leaner NATO could
continue to protect Europe from external threats while the EC
defense pillar could handle all other types of security
concerns. [Ref. 18]
It appears that the Italians are once again playing "the
middle of the road." Their continued bilateral relations with
22
the United States keeps the hedge toward a superpower
relationship and are a constant counter to and EC pillar which
may not recognize Italy's leadership role. Italy has been a
loyal participant in NATO, long supporting its charter and
grateful for its security umbrella. It would be almost
certain that any Italian European commitment would be
secondary to a NATO commitment. The direction of Italy's
defense posture is still somewhat fluid and apparently Italy
likes it that way.
F. EUROPEAN DESTABILIZATION
Although the Soviet military threat has diminished, what
now emerges is uncertainty as to the future character of the
new Russian States. For example, there are multiple nuclear
entities to deal with, each having the potential to be
considerably more unstable than the former Soviet Union in
regard to security policy. Some of the republics appear to be
joining together in a commonwealth resulting in a new threat
to the smaller republics. The collapse of Communist central
economies has posed a major economic threat as well. Italians
are concerned that too many economic assets will be spent on
the reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. What is
feared now is an economic curtain replacing the former iron
one
.
With the East-West conflict now reduced Italy sees many
other threats coming to the fore. The Italians saw the former
23
East-West conflict as having a certain stability associated
with it which now does not exist. Without Soviet influence,
one Central-European country after another has sought
sovereignty; but the road to autonomy includes many obstacles.
Yugoslavia now poses a significant threat to the stability of
the region with the results of its civil war spilling over
into other countries. Italy has had to deal with a sizable
refugee problem from Yugoslavia and Albania while also facing
political instability. Italy recently has been turning
refugees around and repatriating them. The Italian policy of
choice is to send aid and deal with the problem at its origin
within the affected area.
Another concern for Europe's southern flank is the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the implications of rising radical
Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa and the Mid-East. This
has been a destabilizing threat within the region and the
violence and terrorism is being exported to other continents.
Italy continues to have strong economic and political ties
with the former Eastern Bloc countries as well as with this
Southern region. Italian leaders such as Foreign Minister
Gianni De Michelis see the opportunity to use this influence
as a tool to negotiating future East-West as well as North-
South security policies. [Ref. 19]
Each Western European country has peculiar political and
historical factors affecting its stature within the European
Community and the Atlantic Alliance.
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III. ITALIAN POLICIES AND TACTICS IN THE SOUTHERN FLANK
A. ITALIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY
It is interesting that the Communist party of Italy (PCI)
one of the largest Communist entities outside Eastern Europe,
was never able to take firm control of the Italian political
system. Delegates of the Italian Communist Party participate
in local administration and have shared power in the
Parliament, but have been kept from participating in the
governing coalition. [Ref. 20] Never having a
controlling majority, the PCI found it difficult to directly
influence Italian policy but was able to effectively disrupt
progress .
Its anti-NATO stance was the PCI's biggest liability until
the party took a more moderate posture. The PCI's popularity
was derived in the 1970s when they became moderate and
proclaimed their interest in an "historic compromise." At
that time they sought an alliance with other Italian political
parties and by moving right along the political spectrum,
actually accepted many new policies. Most important of these
was their acceptance of Italian membership in NATO and the
formation of West European economic integration. As leading
advocates of Eurocommunism, they became an irritant to the
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Soviet Central Party. The PCI felt that a compromise was
needed to gain increased legitimacy and help Italy out of its
social and economic troubles.
Even with one third of the local electorate in 1986 they
were still excluded from the governing coalition. In spite of
compromise, the five controlling political parties to the
right still felt the PCI to be a threat. The final break
between the PCI and Moscow came with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. This military aggression would move the PCI more
toward the center and place it closer to the Socialists.
Gorbachev's reforms did nothing to reinstate a PCI-Moscow
entente. With the economic barriers dividing the East and
West coming down, the PCI is losing another job it once had,
that of being a broker between Italian sources of capital and
business leaders in Eastern Europe. With the liberal moves
taking place within the East, the Italian Communist Party is
being strained for a reason to exist
.
Italy has a history of difficulty in defining a security
policy. Any attempts have fallen in line with NATO policy.
Unlike the former West Germany, which desired a national
security policy and adapted it to NATO's goals, Italian
security policy has run parallel with NATO's needs more by its
government's default to come up with a consensus on its own.
Consensus can prove difficult when a country has had a new
government, on average, every eleven months since 1946.
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Italy's prime minister has little influence over foreign
and security policy because his office has little authority in
this area. Italy has been marked with not only a weak prime
minister but a weak parliament as well. In addition to this,
the Defense Ministry produces obscure budgets which are not
comprehendible resulting in that ministry being excluded from
important public and parliamentary inquiry. [Ref. 21]
What appears paramount in Italian politics is maintaining
power, which is invested in each position, with policy
formation secondary. The individual's fight to maintain his
stature within the system is far more important than
constructing any productive legislation. [Ref. 22]
Once the fundamental choice was made to align with the West,
foreign policy was set. Thereafter, foreign policy would be
used in domestic political debates which became so complex
that the politicians devoted all their time to them.
This preoccupation with the political game resulted in key
politicians, such as foreign and defense ministers, not
concentrating on the proper management of their departments.
This post-war Italian political system has operated until the
present day. There has been a substantial loss of legitimacy
in this weak governing body.
The absence of political legitimacy has driven the Italian
public to a cynical attitude toward the government resulting
in little interest in politics. While the names change,
political life has stayed the same. Luigi Barzini explains
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this phenomenon in his book The Europeans , as a concept of
good impressions, but neither commitment nor responsibility at
the center. It is said that Italians appear to know
everything, but understand nothing.
During the 1980s, Italian defense policy was marked by a
shift away from the Central Front in the north to increased
threats in Mediterranean. This policy was defined in Italy's
second Defense White Paper in 1985. It is interesting to note
that this new shift of military concern, and a resolve to meet
it head on, was developed under Prime Minister Craxi, Italy's
first Socialist Party Prime Minister. Most Italian parties to
the left have been known to be anti-military. It is also
interesting that Craxi ' s government had two very different
ministers making up an effective team. Andreotti was a pro-
Arab and secretive Foreign Minister while the Defense
Minister, Spadolini was very pro-American and pro-Israeli.
The grand strategy outlined in the White Paper never fully
materialized, but it was one of the first signs that the
Italians were thinking independently about security on the
southern flank.
The Mediterranean issue of terrorism and rising Islamic
fundamentalism caused some tension between Italy and the
United States. The disagreements were over Italy's preference
to use mediation and negotiation in dealing with the crisis
while the US was willing to resort to use of military force.
The two have overcome their differences in this area since the
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Bush Administration adopted a peace plan based upon diplomacy.
[Ref. 23]
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY/ THE NORTH-SOUTH
THREAT
With the collapse of the Communist Eastern Bloc and the
changes it will bring, there develops a variety of
implications for each country. As the weakest of the "Big
Four" European countries in the Atlantic Alliance, Italy's
position is unique. Italy's geographic location within the
Mediterranean and its continued Atlantic Alliance loyalty
makes it an important gatekeeper in NATO's southern flank.
The Soviets believed that dissolving the Warsaw Pact would
trigger a dissolving of all the Western alliances, but this
scenario appears unlikely with the current West European
resolve to work within an alliance. Although Italy publicly
supports an indigenous European defense plan, it plays both
sides of the issue. With Italy's history of allegiance to
NATO, any European defense initiative will most likely be
considered secondary to participation in NATO.
There has been a marked increase in foreign involvement by
Italy in the last couple of decades. These were
uncharacteristic and important moves forward in Italy's quest
to be a leader in foreign policy. Some examples were:
involvement in UNIFIL (1979); the agreements for economic,
technical and military assistance with Malta (1980 and 1986);
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maritime patrol activities in the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of
Aqaba (1982); minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Suez
(1984) and Persian Gulf (1987) and of course participation in
the Persian Gulf war with Iraq in 1991.
They also helped organize the Pentagonal Group in 1989.
All of these are examples of Italy's recent interest in
becoming an active participant within the political sphere of
European security. Italy's Foreign Minister, De Michelis, was
the biggest, maybe the only, Italian advocate of interjecting
an Italian foreign policy. At the present time Italy is
without a controlling cabinet and De Michelis lost his job
after the April, 1992 elections.
Within this emerging era of European security, Italians
see an opportunity to finally be a significant player. They
see this new era as one based upon economic and political
strength vice a military one. Italy has had a rapport with
both North Africa and the former Soviet Union. Their position
is unique, possibly unique enough for them to emerge as
strong future negotiators in North-South as well as East-West
dialogues
.
It may be hard for Americans to see the significance of
the Mediterranean region. They don't see the Mediterranean as
a strategic entity in it's own right. Many Europeans in the
Southern Flank, such as the Italians and the Spanish view the
Mediterranean in a strategic sense. During most of the Cold
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War, this area was thought of as subsidiary to the conflict on
the Central Front, and the Central Region of NATO.
What is argued here is that what has happened over the
last 2 years in the transformation of East-West relations has
made the Mediterranean a much more important region in
strategic terms. This emerging importance can be classified
in many different terms. [Ref. 24] First it is
important in the traditional way. Since 1945 the
Mediterranean has been an extension of the European security
environment. The Italians have always contended that this
body of water to Europe's south could be a security concern.
Europeans are now more concerned about these perceived threats
from the south.
The second way to look at the Mediterranean would be to
consider it as the area where the Persian Gulf begins. The
recent Gulf War experience has shown that logistically , as
well as politically Southern Europe & Africa are linked in
very real terms to what happens in the Middle East.
Another point when looking at the Mediterranean is to
consider it an area of strategic consequence in it's own
right. This is not so much a Mediterranean phenomena as it is
a phenomena of the whole region and worthy of it being
considered a separate security concern. When one looks from
North Africa, the Balkans to the Middle East it becomes
obvious that the whole area is ripe with recent conflict that
demands a Mediterranean security policy.
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Another observation is that constraints across this region
by traditional superpowers have diminished. This can be seen
in many countries like Iraq, Syria or even Israel where the
kinds of constraints which existed in the height of the
superpower conflict are gone. These nations, as well as
others, have taken on a more adventurous role which could not
have existed under superpower pressure. Iraq would not have
been allowed to invade Kuwait, as an example while still under
a strong Soviet influence.
Without superpower presence, the Mediterranean will become
a center of residual military power. As military balance of
power in Europe changes and the level of troop strength comes
down and as countries in East Europe look for a peace divided,
the whole level of military strength in the Southern periphery
of the Mediterranean appears to be growing. These areas, most
of which are outside the realm of the CFE Treaty, are heavily
armed and its members are feeling more and more encircled by
enemies. They are acquiring more capable systems including a
strong interest in non-conventional weapons.
At the same time Italy & Europe look out across the
spectrum of security issues that exist now they see this
spectrum expanding rapidly. Where as during the Cold War,
security perceptions were focused in Central Europe and on
hard military issues now there is a concern over non-
traditional aspects of security as well. These aspects
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include economic, energy, migration as well as religious
fundamentalism.
The refocusing on the Mediterranean has brought forward a
number of regional initiatives. These initiatives, such as
the pentagonal group or CSCM don't necessarily concern
themselves strictly with military issues but also consider
areas in which they feel linked such as economic development
and political cooperation. The positive aspects of these
groups are that they take counties which were not leading
military powers and gives them an active political role
thereby increasing their capabilities.
Both Italy and Spain have lobbied heavily for the success
of these ambitious new groups. These ideas seek to bring
together all areas of the mediterranean to discuss security
issues and to create a synergistic consensus which brings
understanding and stability to the region. Another
observation is that the Iron Curtain is being reconstructed
across the Mediterranean from East to West as a barrier. This
barrier is to deal with radical Islamic fundamentalism,
emigration and other security threats and may eventually take
on a military character. Southern Europeans are concerned
with military threats from North Africa as well as growing
links between countries which are now discreet with political
and ideological ties within North Africa or the Middle East.
There is also a certain fear from the south in regard to
the north. They perceive a hostile north which is shutting
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off the northern emigration and feel the Europeans intolerance
may turn into a more threatening posture. The people in North
Africa and the Mideast see the Europeans opening their
internal borders while at the same time reinforcing their
external ones. There is also fear of the Western European
Union's military aspects. There is uncertainty by the south
about what character this new European defense will have and
what its position will be in regard to the regions south of
the Mediterranean. So even here one can see a perceived
belief that the former superpowers brought stability to the
region
.
When pushed to make a decision between a southern alliance
such as CSCM, and an alliance based more on European
participation, the Italians current posture will be to align
with the European powers. The relations with the south will
have to become secondary to the paramount, basic relationship
to the European Community. The Italians are one of the
strongest advocates of a unified Europe and as so must base
alliance decisions on that position.
As an example, when the Middle East peace initiatives got
going in Madrid in early 1992, Italian participation in CSCM
was slowed because of some conflicts of position between the
US and Europeans on one side, and CSCM policy on the other.
Such moves by Italy demonstrate its current consensus that the
southern initiatives may not be a viable alternative to
European security.
35
Italy does not appear strong enough at the present to
surmount its history of a weak foreign policy. Although they
have had increased military participation in the recent past,
their primary concern now is to focus on emerging stronger
from the new European order and to fully and successfully
integrate into it.
C. ITALIAN DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
A short discusion of Italy's new white paper is warranted.
Italy has met the recent changes in European security by
outlining a new 1992 defense white paper, the first since
1985. This proposal represents one of the first shifts away
from Europe's dependence upon foreign military might.
Although Italy still supports NATO's mission, it sees that
Europeans will need to take a more autonomous role in European
defense. Not to be left out, the Italians propose stepped up
defense spending and a realignment of its command structure
and composition of its forces. All this is aimed at
transforming Italy from a security consumer to a security co-
sponsor inside NATO and Europe. [Ref. 25] To help
implement the plan, the Italian House Defense Committee
passed a $217 billion defense plan for this next year and is
debating to fund a special bill for over $287 billion more in
the next ten years to modernize the Italian military.
[Ref. 26] With the current political turmoil, and no
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national government in Italy, these proposals are in a holding
pattern
.
It is here, as a co-sponsor of security, where Italy feels
it has the opportunity to participate. Its internal political
struggle has always kept Italy's military weak, defense
interest low and Italian statecraft nonexistent. With the
reduced local influence of the PCI, a stronger focus can now
be put on building an effective and impressive defense. This
new position is a positive one as the U.S. military presence
in the Mediterranean proves harder and harder to maintain.
This defense is not based upon pure military might. The
Italians believe that southern flank interests are taking the
form of more political dialogue instead of all military might.
Again, here is where Italy feels it is unique enough to deal
with the pressing issues such as arms control within the
mediterranean region like no other European nation can.
Gianni DeMichelis, Italy's former Foreign Minister, has made
the US, as well as the Europeans, take notice of Italy's




IV. THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER
A. NEW CHALLENGES
The "action-reaction" phenomena, where the East seemed to
react to the West, appears to have shifted. Now the West must
wait for the East to make a move and then react to it. Whether
a European defense entity evolves from the WEU, EC, NATO or
CSCE, it will be structured as a reaction to what will happen
in the East. With the Union of Sovereign Republics unable to
hold together and many East European nations on the ropes, it
does not necessarily follow that peaceful democracy will
prevail. Things will most likely get worse before they get
better and it is not impossible to envision that this area has
the ingredients for a fascist or national movement. The
character of Eastern Europe and the future Soviet Union can
not be defined in such a fluid environment. The West is
really uncertain as to what reaction it must take.
The Soviet Union's breakup and the failing Communist Party
are both having devastating results upon the Europeans as a
whole. The wall which once divided East and West Europe has
been torn down and after the great jubilation subsided,
everyone realized that these stepchildren in the East are now
more of a liability than first conceived. Of course, this all
comes at the worst time for the West because it too is facing
terrible economic times. This has been the greatest reason
for hesitation in fully embracing the East. The hesitation
brings a contradiction because West Europeans have lamented
for decades how the natural Europe has been divided and how
much a unification would be welcomed. Even the Germans are
straining under the cost of reunification. It is now apparent
that the Iron Curtain is being replaced with an economic one.
The West has been hesitant to open economic integration with
the East for fear that the liabilities will surely outweigh
the gains in such an undertaking. The West realizes now that
the economic and environmental conditions of the East are
worse than ever imagined.
The concerns are most certainly not unfounded. The
problems facing the West from the East are indeed numerous and
an open frontier policy may be unobtainable at the present
time. Two of the biggest threats are the deteriorating Eastern
alliances and military structure. In its wake it leaves
economic turmoil, nuclear instability and unleashes regional
conflict
.
When Boris Yeltsin was asked about the current status of
nuclear weapons in Russia he said that they are securing all
of them they can find. Although most are within the Russian
republic, nuclear weapons are also located in "breakaway"
republics like the Ukraine and the Baltic States. Once severe
hunger and desperation have manifested themselves, it could
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only be a matter of time before these weapons might be used
for blackmail, not just within the republics but also against
outside areas. [Ref. 27] It is this continued
strategic capability that has kept NATO's interest peaked.
[Ref. 28] It becomes apparent that there is no other
structure yet on line which can compete with NATO's present
ability to deal with this strategic problem.
B. REGIONAL INSTABILITY
With Eastern Europe out from under Soviet control, ethnic
and national passions have emerged as a serious destabilizing
threat within this region, with the potential to spill over
into neighboring areas.
Italy's strategic geography in relation to the Balkans has
been proven to be a vulnerability. Yugoslavia and Albanian
civil disturbances have created a sizeable refugee problem and
constitutes an expanding threat to regional security that has
yet to see its bounds. Italian planners are now concerned
over the tide of both political and economic refugees across
the Adriatic. In August of 1991 Italy's image as a land of
tolerance was eroded when it turned tens of thousands of
refugees around in the southern port of Bari and sent them
back to their point of embarkation. [Ref. 29]
The worry, shared by other West Europeans is that the mass
migration problem from the East will hurt their already sick
economy. Italy's policy is to help these people within their
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own country. The Italian Foreign Ministry explained that the
new policy was to repatriate these individuals while also
pledging millions of dollars in food aid. [Ref. 30]
This will prove only to be a short term solution to a major
ethnic problem that is indicative of Eastern Europe. The EC
has offered billions of dollars in aid to Yugoslavia but money
doesn't appear to be stopping the unrest. Fighting still
continues and the EC delegation has been unable to entice a
cease-fire. At least a dozen EC sponsored cease-fires have
broken down. Although Yugoslavia has provided a very tough
baptism by fire, the Europeans have not made an effective
showing on their first real attempt at solving their own
problems within Europe.
C. ITALY'S NEW ROLE IN THE SOUTHERN FLANK
Although detente has brought tension down, there are
significant challenges to deal with which cause immediate
refocus and great concern. For Italy, as well as other
Southern European nations, the relaxed tension on the East-
West front has brought renewed tension regarding the southern
threat. This, of course, comes at a bad time when most
countries can ill afford increased defense and when the
decreased tension in Central Europe dictates public support of
decreased military power. Coupled to this is a decrease in
U.S. Naval forces in the Mediterranean and it appears that the
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U.S. will have continued difficulty sustaining future
deployments. Unfortunately, arsenals in North Africa and the
Mid East have no such constraints and in fact are growing with
modern chemical and ballistic missile technology.
The reduced tensions have caused asymmetrical force
reductions throughout the northern area do not appear to be an
appropriate answer for in the Mediterranean region. A strong
military presence may be required to deal with these threats
in the short term. In reality, these southern threats have
long been growing and were only unrecognizable behind the
conflict in the north and the Atlantic Alliance's priority to
it .
Italian security policy is shaped by its alliance role and
its geopolitical position. Italy has two fronts. First,
Italy has a continental dimension by being one of the southern
nations within Europe. On the other front, with its strong
cultural and economic links to the south, it plays the role of
a northern power within North Africa and the Middle East
region. One might say that Italy is the "gate keeper" for
both of these regions; a most difficult position to hold.
Italy divides the mediterranean into two geopolitically
separate areas. The western basin has enjoyed a somewhat
stable period. The Strait of Gibraltar is kept secure by the
British, French, Spanish, and US interest. In contrast, the
eastern basin is marked by many tensions. The Arab Israeli
conflict comes to the forefront, but there are more immediate
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threats to stability in the region such as nuclear
proliferation and the spread of ballistic missile technology.
Iraq is now being watched even closer than Iran was, Islamic
fundamentalism is on the rise, and there is still Greek-
Turkish animosity.
The internal political, social and economic tensions in
this southeast region have made it the number one threat to
peace and a major focus since the fall of the Soviet Union.
The Northern Europeans are enjoying a break in the tension.
They see their defense efforts paying off and now appear more
concerned with the debate over what type of new security
entity should best be employed. Europe's southern region is
not as homogeneous nor secure as the North Central region.
The southern flank is varied and its cohesion has been built
by predominantly bilateral agreements with the United States.
This bilateral first, NATO second, EC and WEU third,
security policy has marked southern flank politics since 1949.
The south never had the same cohesion which was shared in the
north. This has also been Italy's history but there seems to
be a fundamental change which might be leading Italy to
surmount its historic conditions and take a leading role in
developing a Southern flank security policy which is more
multilateral. The Italians believe that greater stability
among the North Central Europeans will lead to greater
exposure to threats in the South. De Michelis saw Italy
moving into the position the US has held as a catalyst for
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strategic cohesion and understanding in the southern area.
Their recent political, as well as military, participation may
be an indication of their ability to do this.
D. EMERGING ITALIAN ASSERTIVENESS
If ever there was a proper niche for Italian participation
in foreign affairs it would be in the Mediterranean. Italy
has looked south in the past decades not so much as a security
concern, but for economic reasons. The Italians import 90% of
their energy supplies with a majority coming from Arab States
such as Libya and Algeria. [Ref. 31] The significant
vulnerability associated with these crucial commodities has
turned an economic issue into a political one. Italy, more
than any other European country, has a strong rapport in the
region from dealing with these Southern Mediterranean
neighbors. This has resulted in a growing assertiveness by
Italy regarding the recent threats in the Mediterranean
region
.
There has been a marked increase in foreign involvement by
Italians in the last couple of decades. Many went unnoticed
by the other western powers but they were indeed important
steps forward in Italy's quest for a larger role in foreign
affairs. Prominent examples of participation were Italy's
involvement in UNIFIL (1979); the agreements for economic,
technical and military assistance with Malta (1980 & 1986);
maritime patrol activities in the straight of Tiran and Gulf
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of Aqaba (1982-1984); minesweeping operations in the Gulf of
Suez (1984) and Persian Gulf (1987). [Ref. 32] All
of these ventures are noticeably in the South and are examples
of Italy's possible resolve to become involved in the North-
South defense. [Ref. 33]
The decade that followed brought Italy's military out of
dormancy and projected it into an assertive foreign role. In
July of 1979 Italian troops were part of a U.N. contingent in
Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) . In September 1980 Italy's foreign
minister was successful in negotiating a guarantee for Maltese
neutrality. With the guarantee came economic and military
assistance. Italy's most significant extraterritorial
military action up to that point came in 1982 with the Beirut
peacekeeping mission and the maritime patrol activities in the
Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. Later in 1984, Italy, at
the request of the Egyptian government, sent minesweepers to
help clear the Gulf of Suez. [Ref. 34]
Although thought of as a token gesture by other Europeans,
Italy's role in the Persian Gulf War with Iraq in 1991 was
extensive for Italy and was another step forward in Italy's
quest for a prominent role in security issues. Italy
contributed to the tense action with ten Tornado attack
aircraft and five warships. It was important for Italy to
demonstrate that it could rise to the threat and show quick
response. Participation also created a great sense of
national pride. All of these examples of assertive action are
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both significant and indicative when viewed within Italy's
historical posture of passiveness
.
The events are seen by many as Italy's ability to surmount
its conditions of the past and seek a larger role in foreign
policy. [Ref. 35]
Italy was also a major organizer of the Pentagonal group
in 1989. This group; Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Austria and Italy meet to discuss mutual political trends,
immigration and security issues. Although the Yugoslav
conflict has caused some dormancy within the group, it is a
good example of the resolve by southern countries to develop
an alliance which was not based upon military issues nor
superpower involvement. Italy also advocated a proposal to
extend CSCE security guarantees to the Mediterranean. Italy
brought nine nations together on 23 March 1990 in Rome which
set the stage for a CSCE conference at Palma de Majorca in
October 1990. This could be seen as Italy's attempt to
counter it's fear of being isolated from Central Europe
security. [Ref. 36]
Italy's uniqueness lies in its geopolitical position in
the Mediterranean. It has a history of positive contact with
a multitude of client nations and a successful record of
economic negotiations. With their previously mentioned
relationship in Central & East Europe, coupled with their
Mediterranean expertise, they would be a strong candidate to
emerge as a leader in North-South negotiations. They
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negotiate with an economic slant but with the political war of
ideology over, this may prove to be what is needed.
E. ITALIAN SECURITY POLICY IN TRANSITION
The handling of the Yugoslav problem is proving to be a
major failure for the EC. Although the Yugoslavian civil war
represents a tough baptism by fire, the Europeans have not
made an effective policy for dealing with this problem in
their own backyard. More than a dozen EC sponsored cease-
fires have failed to stop the bloodshed. Where Italy's
geographic position has been an asset for NATO, it has been a
liability with the Balkans. Yugoslavian and Albanian civil
disturbances have created a refugee problem for Italy. The
Italians have two policies in their approach to stem the flow.
They are turning the refugees around and shipping them back
while at the same time sending financial aid to help deal with
this problem at its origin. [Ref . 37] Italy has
continued economic ties with the South and is very sensitive
to security in the region. Relaxed East-West tensions are
allowing the US to scale down its forces in Europe.
Reductions in the Navy's Sixth Fleet will put added stress
upon the Mediterranean situation. Gapped deployments of
carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean will show the
Italians that US force projection and presence are
diminishing. The Italians noticed with great interest that
during the Gulf War the US pulled its carriers from the
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Mediterranean to reinforce Persian Gulf assets. The military
arsenals in North Africa and the Mid-East are at this same
time growing. Italy fears that the dismantling of the NATO
forces in Europe may be hasty, as first, a full analysis of
the Mediterranean threat needs to be addressed.
Italians have long felt that most Franco-German defense
policies downplay the southern threat and they feel they may
be isolated by these northern Europeans. This is why Italy's
Foreign Minister, De Michelis, has advocated a policy that
includes both a strong Pan-European defense entity as well as
keeping NATO alive and involved. [Ref. 38] He also
supports efforts to unite the Middle East, North Africa and
Southern Europe in a cohesive alliance.
Italy appears to be in a transition period in regard to
security policy. The Italians have been willing to take more
assertive action. Italy seems better informed and shows some
autonomous defense expertise for the first time. The 1979 INF
decision sparked a little informal debate by some experts and
brought about some previously unseen inquisitiveness by the
Italian public. Two years earlier, the 1977 Italian White
Paper only devoted one page to nuclear issues. Although the
public's sensitivity was stimulated, the debates ended with




Italian security policy has been defined as a loyal
alliance to NATO and the EC. These two pillars have brought
security and some stability to an Italy previously unable to
properly develop because of an ineffective government. The
Italians appear to have surmounted their weak historical
conditions and are maturing rapidly toward a European country
which demands a leadership role consistent with its economic
strength. The uncharacteristic military and political action
in which Italy has recently been involved in has demonstrated
its resolve to be a more active participant.
With regard to Franco-German proposals for a new European
Army, this could serve to bring about even more debate between
European leaders. The Franco-German proposal to expand the
existing Franco-German brigade and reduce the role for the
United States broadens the divide between pro-NATO Britain and
Italy and the European Community backers such as France.
Although both Italy and Britain are not totally convinced of
a pan-European defense without US support, they arrive at the
same conclusions for different reasons.
The Italians have always been strong NATO supporters
relying heavily upon the U.S. for its domestic defense. NATO
still represents the fundamental reference point for military
security. They also are skeptical of security policy and
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defense based in the North, feeling that it will not be
sensitive to the threats of the southern flank. With the
growing Southern Mediterranean and Middle East threats, Italy
sees itself as uniquely qualified to take a leading role in
developing security policy within the new European order. The
British see the new security proposals as a possible threat to
their national sovereignty. They do not embrace a dilution of
current British power in the foreign affairs arena and reject
any ideas of losing authority over their nuclear arsenal or
diminished US participation.
An Anglo-Italian defense proposal emerged in October of
1991 which delegated some regional military responsibility to
the nine nation Western European Union. The basic difference
here is that unlike the Franco-German proposals which brings
the WEU under EC control, the Anglo-Italian initiative leaves
major political decisions about European security with NATO.
Paris has continually criticized the proposal because it
leaves too much power with NATO.
Because of a current NATO charter which restricts out-of-
area military response, Britain, Italy and the US may support
the Franco-German proposal if it would cover out-of-area
crises. This, of course, may be too difficult to materialize
because of both German and French resistance to fight outside
their sovereign territories. This fundamental impasse will
surely block forward movement with any proposal until a
compromise is found. While all the debating continues, Italy
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is moving forward with its own plans for increased defense and
is unilaterally moving toward a defense plan for the
Mediterranean
.
Italy's Foreign Minister, along with those of Egypt and
Greece, have set the foundation for an eastern Mediterranean
security arrangement . These foreign ministers said this new
forum, similar to the Conference for Security and Cooperation
of the Mediterranean would open its membership to include
Middle Eastern nations which have outlets to the Mediterranean
Sea. [Ref. 39]
Antonios Samaras, Greek Foreign Minister, spoke positively
of the negotiations and said the Greek objective was to
involve Turkey and Cyprus and was interested in promoting
stability in the Aegean. Early Arab statements appear
promising with Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa promoting
the establishment of confidence-building and arms control
measures. Their biggest concern is weapons of mass
destruction. Italy's interest in establishing this arena was
due to France's resistance to expanding the Conference for
Security and Cooperation of the Mediterranean to include some
eastern Mediterranean nations. The CSCM includes Spain,
France, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia and Libya.
Although economic integration is moving forward, it will
be harder now to keep Europeans linked in the area of
security. Keeping Europe and the US coupled over security
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threats will not be easy. The problem of strategic "coupling"
has always been complex in the Southern flank. It was
important to try to assure the credibility of the deterrence
across the Atlantic but also to keep North and South Europe
linked. With the major threat in North Central Europe
diminished, it will be even harder to keep the north and south
united. The problem will be "fragmentation" in approaches to
security by Southern flank nations which see the North as
insensitive to the southern threats. Italy has already
embarked upon a regional security plan for the Mediterranean.
If fragmentation occurs, it will need a center, a common
strength. This center stability may be the long standing
cooperation which has endured within NATO.
Taken together with the risks in North Africa and the
Middle East, it is clear that many threats to Europe will come
from the South. Being that most of this region is out-of-area
for NATO, it may be imperative that NATO adopt a more relevant
position. This will help NATO be responsive to a range of
issues which were previously outside their traditional
security realm.
Italian leadership sees the new European order based on
political and economic power and not necessarily on military
might. The Italians see themselves as uniquely able to handle
major security negotiations in the Southern region. They have
overcome their own self doubts and the task before them is to
convince other Europeans that Italy commands their attention.
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With regard to Italy's relationship with the US, Italians
still see the US as a counter-balance to the emerging strength
of Britain, Germany and France. The U.S. gives Italy both a
nuclear and Mediterranean guarantee which may not come from a
Franco-German derived defense umbrella. Italy's current
posture would lead to the conclusion that it still considers
the NATO alliance primary. If Italy feels the South may be
isolated by an insensitive North and will continue to propose
Southern region security. Of course at the time of this
writing, Italy's government is undergoing yet another complete
change of its ruling cabinet. There is a certain stability in
Italy's unstable government. Although governments come and
go, Italy stands as a very stable ally for both the US and its
European neighbors. Italy may just emerge unique enough to
lead the Mediterranean countries into a Southern Alliance




APPENDIX. CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS
1945 Mussolini captured and executed; World War II
ends in Italy; abdication of King Victor Emmanuel
III
1946 Establishment of the Italian Republic; formation
of government of national unity which joins
Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists
1947 Communists and Socialists parties ejected from
controlling government
1948 New republican Constitution goes into effect;
first parliamentary election produces major
Christian Democratic victory; Marshall plan
implemented
1949 Formation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization with Italy as a charter member
1952 Italy joins the European Coal and Steel Community
1956-59.... Communists and Socialists diverge; Communists
announce program of a "Italian path to socialism"
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1968-69... Emergence of student and labor unrest; terrorist
violence breaks out
1973 Communists propose the "historic compromise"
1975 Socialist withdraw from center-left coalition
1976 Christian Democrats form a government dependent
on Communist abstention; Communists receive
several parliamentary seats
1979 Communists withdraw from parliamentary majority,
bringing down the government
1980 Socialists join the government which recreates
the center-left coalition
1983 Bettino Craxi, a Socialist, forms a government,
the first postwar government lead by a non-
Christian Democrat
1985 Craxi government falls
1991 Italy's defense forces participate with a
coalition in the Gulf War
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1992 In January, Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis
suggests a leading role for Italy in a pan-
European defense force; April elections bring
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